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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W I L L I A M H A R O L D K E N D R I C K , \ 
Defendant-Appellant, i 
Case No. 
xro > 
[ 13888 
T H E S T A T E O F U T A H , \ 
Plaintiff-Respondent. J 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is a prosecution for robbery, a felony of the 
second degree, under the provisions of Section 76-6-301, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
D I S P O S I T I O N IN T H E L O W E R COURT 
After a trial before a jury which returned a ver-
dict of "quilty of robbery as charged in the informa-
tion", the trial court entered a judgment and commit-
ment sentencing defendant-appellant to the Utah State 
Prison for the indeterminate term (1-15 years) as pro-
vided by law for the crime of robbery. 
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R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Defendant-appellant seeks reversal of the judg-
ment and commitment based on said verdict and the 
discharge of said defendant-appellant or, that failing, 
reversal of said judgment and commitment and remand 
of the case back to the trial court for a new trial. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On June 27, 1974, defendant-appellant and James 
E . Travis were charged by a Complaint filed in the 
City Court of Salt Lake City with aggravated robbery 
in violation of Sections 76-6-301(1) and 76-6-301(1) 
(a) a first degree felony ". . . as follows, to-wit: that 
said James E. Travis and William Harold Kendrick, 
. . . [on or about the 26th day of June, 1974 at the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah] . . . , robbed Blair 
C. Roberts and Robert C. Zancanella, and in so doing 
used a deadly weapon, to wit: a wooden club; . . . " (R. 
10). On July 18, 1974, a preliminary hearing was held, 
after which the court dismissed the charge of aggra-
vated robbery, ordered that the Complaint be amended 
to charge non-aggravated robbery and bound both de-
fendants over to stand traial in the District Court on 
the Amended Complaint (R. 2). 
On July 25, 1974, an Information was filed by 
the Salt Lake County Attorney charging James E. 
Travis and William Harold Kendrick with "robbery, 
a felony of the second degree, in violation of Section 
76-6-301, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, as 
follows, to-wit: that on or about the 26th day of June, 
2 
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1974, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the said 
James E. Travis and William Harold Kendrick rob-
bed Blair C. Roberts and Robert C. Zancanella; . .•-•"•• 
( R . l l ) . 
On July 26, 1974, both defendants entered pleas 
of "not guilty" to the crime of robbery as charged in 
the information (See Minute Entry, R. 13). Motions 
to Sever were filed in behalf of defendant Travis on 
July 29, 1974 (R. 16) and by defendant Kendrick on 
August 26,1974 (R. 19). 
On August 9, 1974, the undersigned was appointed 
as counsel for the defendant-appellant (Minute Entry 
of August 9,1974, R. 17 and Order of August 16,1974, 
R. 18). 
On August 26, 1974, the date set for joint trial 
of defendant-appellant and his co-defendant, James E. 
Travis, the court heard argument and took testimony 
on the Motions to Sever of each of said defendants and 
thereafter granted the Motion to Sever and ordered 
that defendant-appellant's co-defendant, James E. 
Travis, be tried first, beginning on that date. (See 
Minute Entry of August 26, 1974, R. 23-24; Tran-
script of Proceedings of Monday, August 26, 1974, pps. 
1-21). 
The trial of defendant-appellant's co-defendant, 
James E. Travis commenced thereafter. In addition to 
the evidence presented by the state therein, James E . 
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Travis took the stand and testified in his own defense. 
During his testimony he testified, in substance and 
effect, that the robbery was committed by defendant-
appellant (See Minutes of August 27, 1974 and August 
28, 1974, R. 25 and R. 26; See also Transcript pps. 
195-252). 
Following introduction of further evidence, in-
structions by the court and argument by counsel, the 
jury returned the verdict finding James E. Travis 
guilty of robbery as charged in the information (See 
Minutes of August 28, 1974; R. 27 and Verdict, R. 49). 
On September 20, 1974, defendant-appellant's co-
defendant, James E . Travis, was committed to the cus-
tody of Division of Corrections under Utah Code 76-3-
404 for ninety-days evaluation period and ordered to 
be returned to court on December 27, 1974 for sentenc-
ing (See Minutes of September 20, 1974, R. 90 and 
Order, R. 96). 
From that Order James E . Travis appealed to 
this court in a separate appeal No. 13834 entitled, 
"State of Utah, Plaintiff-respondent vs. James E . 
Travis, Defendant-appellant." As of the date of this 
Brief, said appeal is still pending. 
On September 11, 1974, defendant-appellant's 
severed jury trial commenced before the Honorable 
Jay E. Banks, District Judge, sitting with a jury and 
continued to September 12. At the conclusion of the 
4 
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trial, the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant-
appellant guilty of robbery as charged in the informa-
tion (See Minute Entries of September 11, 1974, R. 
58-59 and September 12, 1974, R. 54-57 and Verdirt, 
R.86-2ndpage). 
During his case in chief, the prosecutor repeatedly 
referred to, and questioned witnesses concerning, Ex-
hibit 7, a steel pinch bar with an electrical cord wrapped 
around it to form a handle. At the conclusion of the 
prosecution's case in chief, Exhibit 7 was received into 
evidence over defendant-appellant's objections (TR. 
137, R. 60). 
After the prosecution rested its case in chief, de-
fendant-appellant, in his own defense, took the stand 
and testified, in substance and effect, that he and his 
co-defendant had been subjected to homosexual assault 
by Robert C. Zancanella while patronizing the Radio 
City Lounge; that after the lounge had closed, they, 
together with Lynn Ruwe, went to a party at the 
home of Duane Daniel, the day bartender at the Radio 
City Lounge; that while at the party, he was subjected 
to an homosexual assault by Duane Daniel whereupon 
defendant-appellant, his fiancee and his co-defendant 
left the party and returned to the Radio City Lounge 
to buy beer; that he entered the Radio City Lounge 
and was subjected to another homosexual assault by 
Robert C. Zancanella whereupon he hit Zancanella; 
that Blair Roberts then entered into the fight and de-
fendant hit Blair Roberts (TR. 152-156). Defendant-
5 
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appellant further testified that he then left the bar and 
that no robbery occurred. Defendant-appellant ex-
plained the presence of money and other property al-
legedly taken in the robbery in the car of Miss Ruwe 
at the time of their arrest by theorizing either that 
Duane Daniel left those objects in the car during the 
ride from the Radio City Lounge to Daniel's home or 
that Travis or Lynn Ruwe took the property from the 
home of Duane Daniel and left it in the car (TR. 160-
163). 
In its rebuttal, the prosecution called defendant-
appellant's co-defendant, James E. Travis. When 
Travis refused to testify, the prosecution was permit-
ted, over defense objections, to ask Travis leading ques-
tions which incorporated the testimony given in his own 
earlier severed trial. Travis declined to answer said 
questions on the ground that it might tend to incrim-
inate him (TR. 185-187). In addition, the prosecution 
was permitted to introduce testimony of the court re-
porter who reported the proceedings at Travis' trial 
and who read, verbatim from her notes, the testimony 
of Travis given in his own defense at his trial (TR. 
187-196). 
The substance and effect of Travis' testimony was 
that defendant-appellant was the one who robbed Rob-
erts and Zancanella at the Radio City Loung (TR. 
196-252). Defendant-appellant made timely and con-
tinuous objections to the foregoing (TR. 188, 193, 195-
196, 253-254, 260-261) and made timely Motion for 
6 
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Mistrial (TR. 253, 260-261) and Motion to Strike 
(TR. 254, 261). Counsel for defendant-appellant at-
tempted to cross-examination Travis but Travis in-
voked his 5th Amendment privilege and refused to 
testify (TR. 256-260). 
Following instructions by the court, the prosecutor 
argued, in his summation, over the objections of the de-
fense, that because defendant refused to tell the police 
officers, during their interrogation of him on the morn-
ing of the alleged robbery, what happened at Daniel's 
party and at the Radio City Lounge, that defendant-
appellant's testimony was unworthy of belief (TR. 262-
264). 
Upon the verdict finding defendant-appellam 
guilty of robbery as charged in the information, the 
court entered a judgment and commitment directing 
the defendant-appellant be confined and imprisoned in 
the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term (1 
to 15 years) provided by law for the crime of robbery 
(R. 98-99) (TR. 272). 
From that judgment and commitment, defendant-
appellant brings this appeal. 
Additional facts will be discussed and developed 
within the body of the Argument. 
A R G U M E N T 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D IN P E R -
M I T T I N G T H E P R O S E C U T O R TO ASK 
7 
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L E A D I N G A N D S U G G E S T I V E Q U E S T I O N S 
O F A P R O S E C U T I O N W I T T N E S S , A P P E L -
L A N T ' S C O - D E F E N D A N T , J A M E S E. TRAV-
IS , A N D I N P E R M I T T I N G T H E COURT R E -
P O R T E R W H O R E P O R T E D T R A V I S ' T R I A L 
TO T E S T I F Y AS TO T R A V I S ' T E S T I M O N Y 
A T H I S O W N T R I A L C O N C E R N I N G A P P E L -
L A N T ' S P A R T I C I P A T I O N I N T H E AL-
L E G E D R O B B E R Y W H E R E T R A V I S ' T R I A L 
H A D B E E N S E V E R E D FROM T H A T O F A P -
P E L L A N T A N D W H E R E T H E PROSECU-
T I O N H A D K N O W L E D G E T H A T T R A V I S 
W O U L D R E F U S E TO A N S W E R Q U E S T I O N S 
P R O P O U N D E D B Y T H E P R O S E C U T I O N ON 
T H E G R O U N D T H A T H I S A N S W E R S 
W O U L D T E N D TO I N C R I M I N A T E H I M . 
Article I , Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides in part, "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right . . . to be confronted by the wit-
nesses against him . . . " and the 6th Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States provides in part, 
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the r i g h t . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against 
h i m . . . " 
The undersigned has been unable to find any Utah 
cases which specifically holds whether the right of con-
frontation guaranteed by Article I, Section 12, of the 
Constitution of Utah does or does not include or imply 
8 
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the right of cross-examination, effective cross-examin-
ation or cross-examination by counsel. 
The Utah State Legislature has enacted, in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, two statutes which, though inapplicable to this 
case, seem to implement Article I, Section 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah or apparently purport to be con-
trolled thereby: 
"77-1-8. The Rights of Defendant.—In crim-
inal prosecutions, the defendant is entitled: 
(1) To appear and defend in person by coun-
sel. 
(4) To be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, except that, where the charge has been pre-
liminary examined before a commiting magis-
trate and the testimony taken down by question 
or answer in the presence of the defendant, who 
has, either in person or by counsel, cross-exam-
ined or had an opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness, or where the testimony of a witness on 
the part of the state, who is unable to give secur-
ity for his appearance, has been conditionally 
in like manner in the presence of the defendant, 
who has, either in person or by counsel, cross-
examined or has had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, the deposition of such wit-
ness may be read, upon its being satisfactorily 
shown to the court that he is dead or insane or 
cannot with due deligence be found within the 
state . . . " [Emphasis Added] 
"77-44-3. Reported testimony used at subse-
9 
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quent trial, when.—Whenever in any court of 
record the testimony of any witness in any crim-
inal case shall be stenographically reported by 
an official court reporter, and thereafter such 
witness shall die or be beyond the jurisdiction of 
the court in which the case is pending, either 
party to the action may read in evidence the 
testimony of such witness, when duly certified 
by the reporter to be correct, in any subsequent 
trial law, or proceeding had in, the same cause, 
subject only to the same objections that might be 
made, if such witness were upon the stand and 
testifying in open court." [Emphasis Added] 
Clearly, Sections 77-1-8 and 77-44-3 cannot be in-
voked to justify the receipt into evidence of the court 
reporter's testimony in this case simply because neither 
of those provisions was invoked nor could they have 
application, by their own terms. 77-1-8 (4) requires that 
the testimony at preliminary hearing be "in the pres-
ence of the defendant, who has, either in person or by 
counsel, cross-examined or had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness" and the state made no showing, 
indeed could not show, "that the witness is dead or in-
sane or cannot with due diligence be found within the 
state." 77-44-3 impliedly requires that the earlier trial 
be the trial of the defendant against whom the testi-
mony is offered and the state did not show and could 
no show that the witness was dead or beyond the juris-
diction of the court. 
The undersigned has been unable to find any Utah 
cases which hold whether the right of confrontation 
10 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
guaranteed by Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution 
of Utah does or does not include or imply the right to 
cross-examination, the right of effective cross-examin-
ation or the right to cross examination by counsel. Sec-
tions 77-1-8(1) and (4), though not apropos to this 
case, appear to guarantee by statute the right to cross-
examination and cross-examination by counsel where 
the accused has counsel. The trial court did not indi-
cate whether it was applying Section 77-44-3 in ad-
mitting the reporter's testimony of Travis' statement 
in his own defense at his own trial. I t does not appear 
from reading the transcript that Section 77-44-3 was 
the basis for its admission. 
The undersigned has been unable to find any Utah 
cases which test the constitutionality of Section 77-44-3 
in light of the guarantees contained in Article I, Sec-
tion 12 of the Constitution of Utah and in the 6th 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
Section 77-44-3 is, however, patently unconstitutional 
unless there is implied therein the requirement that the 
accused be accorded the right to confront the witness 
and to cross-examine said witness. Bruton vs. U.S., 
391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed. 2d 476; Pointer 
vs. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065,13 L.Ed.2d 923; 
Douglas vs. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 
13 L.Ed.2d 934; Barber vs. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 
S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed. 2d 255. 
The foregoing not withstanding, however, the 
right of an accused to confront the witnesses against 
11 
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him guaranteed by the 6th Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States (and presumably Article 
I, Section 12 of the Constituion of Uah by virtue of 
the supremacy clause, Article 6, Clause 2, Constitution 
of the United States) implies the right to effective 
cross-examination of those witnesses (See Douglas vs. 
Alabama, supra; Pointer vs. Texas, supra; Bruton vs. 
U.S., supra; Barber vs. Page, supra) by counsel (See 
Gideon vs. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 
L.Ed. 2d 799, 93 A.L.R. 2d 733; Pointer vs. Texas, 
supra;) and that right is not satisfied by the mere fact 
that the witnesses are present in court (See Bruton vs. 
U.S., supra; Douglas vs. Alabama, supra;) or take 
the stand to deny that they made the statements (See 
Douglas vs. Alabama, supra) or exercise their 5th 
Amendment privilege against self incrimination (See 
Douglas vs. Alabama, supra). 
The aforesaid right of cross examination is deemed 
a right "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" and 
is made obligatory upon the states by the 14th Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States. Pointer 
vs. Texas, supra; Douglas vs. Alabama, supra; Malloy 
vs. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed. 2d 
653. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his opinions concurring in 
the results in Pointer and Gideon stated that the right 
is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and thus 
secured to defendants in state prosecutions by the 14th 
Amendment under the rationale of Palko vs. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (13 L. 
Ed. 2d at page 929; 9 L.Ed. 2d at page 810). 
12 
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The case at bar and the procedure employed by 
the trial court and by the prosecution herein is unique. 
I t would be unusual indeed to find a case precisely 
identical to the instant case where the following fea-
tures were present: 
1. Where the accused and his co-defendant were 
represented by separate and unassociated counsel; 
2. Where there was a severance of the trials of 
joint defendants prior to trial, and where the co-de-
fendant was convicted in his severed case tried first; 
3. Where the co-defendant took the stand and 
testified in his own defense, which testimony inculpated 
the accused; 
4. Where the co-defendant had not been sentenced 
at the time of trial of the accused and where the co-
defendant genuinely contemplated appeal of his con-
viction; 
5. Where the co-defendant was called by the 
prosecution as a witness against the accused and where 
the co-defendant refused to testify and based his re-
fusal upon the co-defendant's 5th Amendment right 
against self-incrimination; 
6. Where the prosecutor knew that the co-de-
fendant would not testify; 
7. Where the court permitted the prosecutor to 
ask leading questions of the co-defendant whereby the 
13 
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prosecutor read into the record the testimony which 
inculpated the accused; 
8. Where the court admitted the testimony of the 
court reporter who reported the co-defendant's trial 
and permitted the court reporter to read, before the 
jury, verbatim, the co-defendant's statements inculpat-
ing the accused; 
9. Where the co-defendant refused to answer the 
questions by counsel for the accused on cross-examin-
ation on the ground that the co-defendant's answers 
might tend to incriminate him; and 
10. Where the refusal by the co-defendant to test-
ify against the accused was not procured by the accused. 
The writer of this brief has been unable, after ex-
tensive research, to find a case incorporating all of the 
foregoing features. The case of Douglas vs. Alabama, 
supra, decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in 1965, however, is almost identical and incorp-
orates almost all of the salient features of this case. 
In Douglas, there were the following identical or par-
allel features: 
1. Douglas and his co-defendant, Loyd, were rep-
resented by the same attorney. 
2. There was a severance of the trials of Doug-
las and Loyd prior to trial and Loyd was convicted in 
his severed case tried first. 
14 
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3. Loyd did not take the stand in his own trial 
but apparently had previously given an out of court 
statement to the police, which out of court statement in-
culpated Douglas. 
4. Loyd had not been sentenced at the time of the 
trial of Douglas and Loyd genuinely contemplated 
appeal of his conviction. 
5. Loyd was called by the prosecution as a witness 
against Douglas and Loyd refused to testify and based 
his refusal upon Loyd's 5th Amendment right against 
self-incrimination. 
6. The prosecutor knew Loyd would not testify. 
7. The court permitted the prosecutor to ask lead-
in gquestions of Loyd whereby the prosecutor read 
into the record the out of court statement of Loyd 
which inculpated Douglas. 
8. Loyd's alleged out of court statement was 
marked as an Exhibit but was not offered or received 
into evidence. 
9. The decision in Douglas, does not show whether 
or not there was any attempt to cross examine Loyd 
by counsel for Douglas. 
10. There was no suggestion that Loyd's refusal to 
testify against Douglas was procured by Douglas. 
The variations between the salient features in 
15 
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Douglas and those in the case at bar are minor and of 
little or no legal significance. If anything, the proced-
ures employed by the prosecution and the trial court 
in the case at bar are more flagrant and prejudicial 
than in Douglas. The Supreme Court of the United 
States reversed Douglas' conviction on the ground that 
Douglas' inability to cross examine his co-defendant as 
to the alleged confession plainly denied him the right 
of cross examination secured by the confrontation clause 
of the 6th Amendment and made obligatory on the 
States by the Due Process provisions of the 14th 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
In Douglas, the court stated: 
"Since the solicitor [prosecutor] was not a 
witness, the inference from his reading that Loyd 
made the statement could not be tested by cross-
examinaion. Similarly, Loyd could not be cross-
examined on a statement imputed to but not 
admitted by him. Nor was the opportunity to 
cross-examine the law enforcement officers ade-
quate to redress this denial of the essential right 
secured by the Confrontation Clause. Indeed, 
their testimony enhanced the danger that the 
jury would treat the Solicitor's questioning of 
Loyd and Loyd's refusal to answer as providing 
the truth of Loyd's alleged confession. But since 
their evidence tended to show only that Loyd 
mad the confession, cross examination of them 
as to its genuineness could not substitute for 
cros-examination of Loyd to test the truth of the 
statement itself. Motes vs. United States, 178 
U.S. 458, 44 L.Ed. 1150, 20 S.Ct. 993; cf. Kirbv 
v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 43 L.Ed. 890, 19 
S.Ct. 574. 
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"Hence, effective confrontation of Loyd was 
possible only if Loyd affirmed the statement as 
his. However, Loyd did not do so, but relied on 
his privilege to refuse to answer. W e need not 
decide whether Loyd properly invoked the priv-
ilege in light of his conviction. I t is sufficient for 
the purposes of deciding petitioner's claim undes 
the Confrontation Clause that no suggestion is 
made that Loyd's refusal to answer was procured 
by the petitioner, see Motes v. United States, 
supra, 178 U . S . at 471, 44 L .Ed , at 1154; on 
this record it appears that Loyd was acting en-
tirely in his own interests in doing so . . ." 13 L . 
Ed . 2d at p. 938. 
That the court permitted the prosecutor to read 
into the record Travis ' testimony at his own trial and 
that the court admitted the verbatim record of that 
testimony is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant 
guaranteed by the 6th and 14th Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States cannot be denied. 
Bruton vs. U.S. , supra; Pointer vs. Texas, supra; 
Gideon vs. Wainwright, supra. 
The extreme prejudice to appellant generated by 
the introduction by the prosecution and receipt by 
the court of Travis ' testimony in his own severed trial 
without according appellant an opportunity to cross-
examine Travis is made even more apparent when, after 
reading the entire record in this case, it is observed 
that there was no hint or suggestion to the j u ry that 
a weapon, more particularly the pinch bar received in 
evidence as Exhibit 7, had been used in the alleged 
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robbery, apart from the very presence, and brandish-
ment by the prosecution, of Exhibit 7 in the view 
of the jury. 
I t should be noted that the very exhibition of the 
pinch bar to the jury, let alone the receipt of it into 
evidence by the court, was error and prejudicial error, 
for two fundamental reasons: 
1. The pinch bar (Exhibit 7) was irrelevant and 
incompetent because: 
a. The charge was non-aggravated robbery. 
b. The original Complaint charging aggravated 
robbery, which the court at preliminary hearing 
ordered dismissed and amended to charge non-
aggravated robbery, did not allege that a pinch 
bar or a steel instrument of any kind was used, 
but merely alleged the use of a wooden club. 
c. There was absolutely no evidence [except 
whatever was shown by Travis' prior testimony 
in his own case (TR. 207-209, 228, 230, 232-233, 
241 and 246)] before the jury which tended to 
show that a club of any kind, let alone the steel 
pinch bar (Exhibit 7), was used in the alleged 
robbery and there was absolutely no evidence which 
could, in any way, connect the pinch bar to the 
alleged robbery. 
2. Exhibit 7, the steel pinch bar approximately 12 
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to 16 inches in length with an electrical corp wrapped 
around one end to form a handle, had a shocking and 
gruesome appearance, particularly when the concept of 
its use as a weapon was suggested by the prosecution, 
and its introduction and receipt into evidence could 
only serve to inflame the jury against the appellant. 
I t seems incongruous that the prosecution would 
introduce, and vouch for, testimony given by Travis 
at his earlier, severed trial which testimony tended to 
exculpate Travis and inculpate the appellant and at 
the same time seek, obtain and attempt to sustain the 
conviction of Travis in spite of the fact Travis' testi-
mony exculpates Travis. 
I t is also unfortunate that the trial court would, 
on one hand, grant a motion to sever the trials of Travis 
and appellant, which motion was grounded upon ex-
treme prejudice to the defendants resulting from their 
asserting radically different versions as to what hap-
pened in connection with the alleged offense, and then, 
on the other hand, permit the introduction of Travis' 
version, radically different from that of appellant, in 
such a way that appellant could have no opportunity to 
cross-examine Travis on Travis' version. In so doing, 
the court compounded the prejudice which required 
severance in the first place. 
SUMMARY A N D CONCLUSION 
Appellant was deprived of his constitutionally 
guaranteed right to confront the witnesses against him 
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and to cross-examine those witnesses where the court 
permitted the prosecutor to ask leading and suggestive 
questions of appellant's co-defendant and where the 
court permitted the verbatim record of said co-defend-
ant's testimony in his own behalf given at his own trial 
to be used in appellant's trial under the circumstances 
where appellant could not cross-examine his co-de-
fendant. Under the circumstances of this case, appel-
lant has been prejudiced in the extreme by the actions 
of the prosecutor in adducing Travis' testimony and 
the pinch bar and by the court in receiving said evi-
dence. Appellant's conviction should be set aside and 
appellant discharged or, that failing, the case should be 
remanded for a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this 20. day of March, 
1975. 
H O U S L E Y & BLACK 
316 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(^Atforneys for Defendam-Appellant 
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Filed 10 copies of the within Brief 
with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
and served 2 copies on the plaintiff-respondent 
by delivering copies thereof to his attorney 
The Attorney General for the State of Utah 
thisr^) day of March, 1975. 
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